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The Federal Arbitration Act and Individual Employment 
Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End 
William F. Kolakowski III 
INTRODUCTION 
To fulfill our traditional obligation means that we. should provide 
mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the shortest pos-
sible time, with the least possible expense, and with a minimum of 
stress on the participants. That is what justice is all about. 
- Warren E. Burgert 
In a 1982 speech, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued that arbi-
tration represented one of the most promising mechanisms for the 
efficient achievement of justice and that its use "ha[ d] been ne-
glected"2 in the private sector. Today, growing enthusiasm for all 
forms of alternative dispute resolution is replacing the neglect to 
which Burger referred. The increasing number of cases arbitrated 
in recent years reflects this enthusiasm.3 
The many advantages that arbitration offers over typical court-
room litigation helps to explain this increase. Arbitration typically 
resolves claims more quickly and with less expense than traditional 
litigation.4 Moreover, arbitration provides increased flexibility, 
which allows parties to adapt it to their particular situation.s 
Although arbitration does have several weaknesses6 - notably, the 
1. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982). 
2. Id. at 276. . 
3. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitra-
tion Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1305 n.7 (1985) (citing 1985 Caseload Figures of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA), which showed a 70% increase in the number of labor 
cases submitted to arbitration under the AAA since 1972). 
4. BETTE J. RoTii ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE REsoLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE 
§§ 1:2, :19 (1993). 
5. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985) 
(maintaining that adaptability is a "hallmark[]" of arbitration). Parties to arbitration hear-
ings can often choose their own "judge" and procedures. See RoTii ET AL., supra note 4, 
§§ 3:7, 4:6. By allowing parties to choose their own adjudicator, arbitration provides litigants 
with the opportunity to choose an individual who possesses a greater level of expertise re-
garding the dispute than a typical trier of fact might have. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633 
(citing "access to expertise" as another hallmark of arbitration). 
6. Besides the lack of a jury, courts have also criticized the absence of standard rules of 
evidence and a complete record of proceedings. Arbitration also places tµnitations on rights 
and procedures available in civil trials, such as discovery and cross-examination. Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974). Alexander recognized, however, that "it is 
the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, 
and expeditious means for dispute resolution." 415 U.S. at 58. The Supreme Court has also 
recently stated that "[g]eneralized attacks on arbitration .•• are 'far out of step with our 
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [arbitration].'" Gilmer v. Inter-
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lack of a jriry - many litigants now see arbitration as a superior 
option to otherwise long and costly resolutions of their claims in 
court.7 
In practice, most arbitrations have the following characteristics 
in common: 
(1) [T]he parties choose to have a dispute or disputes decided by a 
third party, called an arbitrator; (2) the parties choose the arbitrator 
or a method for his or her selection; (3) the arbitrator hears the dis-
pute; (4) the arbitrator makes a binding award; (5) the arbitrator's 
decision is, subject to very limited grounds of review, final and en-
forceable ... in the same manner as a judgment.s 
Arbitration in this form was not uncommon at the turn of the cen-
tury,9 but federal courts generally refused to enforce arbitral agree-
ments until the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
(FAA).10 In addition to making arbitration agreements "valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable,"11 the FAA provides for stays of pro-
ceedings pending arbitration12 and orders to compel arbitration.13 
In recent years the Supreme Court has stated that, by enacting the 
FAA, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration,14 
The Court has expressed further support for arbitration by stating 
that federal courts should resolve doubts about the scope of arbitra-
tion agreements in favor of arbitration.is 
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). 
Arbitration can be inappropriate in some situations. Some statutes grant enforcement 
powers to administrative agencies to act in the public interest in addition to granting individ-
ual causes of action. Arbitration of the individual claims can prevent the administrative 
agency from carrying out its mandates. Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration 
Work?, 61 UMKC L. REv. 693, 718-19 (1993). Other statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, create individual employment rights that Congress never intended to submit to 
arbitration or that simply may be better protected in a court of law. See generally Jeffrey R. 
Knight, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 61 DEF. 
CoUNS. J. 251 (1994). 
7. Arbitration has proven useful in resolving a wide variety of disputes. A glance at the 
table of contents of the 1978 publication Wide World of Arbitration reflects arbitration's util-
ity in disputes involving labor, U.S. and international commercial agreements, insurance, 
medical malpractice, health care, and more. AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssN., WmE WORLD 
OF ARBITRATION at iii-v (Charlotte Gold & Susan Mackenzie eds., 1978). 
8. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw 7 (1992). 
9. Id. at 15. 
10. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993)). The Act was originally cited to as the United States Arbitration Act and many early 
sources, including materials referenced in this Note, refer to it as such. Today it is more 
commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act and this Note uses this common term. 
11. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
12. 9 u.s.c. § 3 (1988). 
13. 9 u.s.c. § 4 (1988). 
14. Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
15. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) 
("The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
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Although arbitration could be useful in resolving individual em-
ployment contract disputes, confusion in the federal courts about 
the applicability of the FAA is hampering arbitration's develop-
ment in this context.16 The FAA can be used to enforce arbitration 
provisions in individual employment contracts because its· coverage 
extends to all arbitration agreements in "contract[ s] evidencing ... 
transaction[s] involving commerce."17 Some courts have been re-
luctant to use the Act to enforce arbitral provisions in individual 
employment contracts, however, because the definition of "com-
merce" in section 1 of the Act contains language exempting certain 
employment contracts. This language reads: "but nothing herein 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce."18 Courts have split over whether they should 
read this exception broadly19 - effectively excluding all employ-
ment contracts from its coverage - or narrowly20 - exempting 
only employment contracts of railroad employees, seamen, and 
analogous classes of workers in the transportation industries.21 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ... • ");see also United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). 
16. Arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements are enforceable under the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141-188 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (allowing parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement to bring a breach of contract action under§ 301(a) of 
the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), for failure to adhere to an 
arbitration provision in the agreement). But because the LMRA's coverage only extends to 
collective bargaining agreements, individual employee contracts must be enforced under the 
FAA if the federal courts are to have jurisdiction over them. 
17. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
18. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). This Note will refer to this language as the "employment contract 
exception." 
19. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods. Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 
224 (4th Cir. 1954) (reading the exception broadly in light of Congress's authority under the 
commerce power). Other courts have reached the same conclusion in dictum. See Pritzker v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir. 1993); Willis v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. 948 F.2d 305, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1991). 
20. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (limiting the exception's coverage to workers in the transportation indus-
tries), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F2d 
1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) 
(same); Tenney Engg., Inc. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F2d 450, 
452-53 (3d Cir.1953) (en bane) (same); Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952, 
957-58 (D. Md. 1994) (same); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240-
42 (D.NJ. 1994) (same). 
21. The confusion among the lower courts regarding the scope of the employment con-
tract exception is perhaps best symbolized by two recent decisions that rejected authoritative 
precedent in their respective courts. In Pritzker, a Third Circuit panel stated its support for a 
broad reading of the exception in dictum. 7 F.3d at 1120. Pritzker contradicted the Third 
Circuit's earlier decision in Tenney Engineering, which was one of the first decisions to adopt 
a narrow reading. Tenney Engg., 207 F2d at 452-53. 
The decision of a Maryland district court provides an ironic counterpart to Pritzker. In 
Kropfelder, the district court stated its support for a narrow reading of the exception. 859 F. 
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Despite this split - and despite the fact that the Supreme Court 
has frequently heard disputes concerning the FAA over the past 
two decades22 - the Court has yet to rule on the issue of the excep-
tion's scope.23 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.24 presented 
Supp. at 957-58. This district court is within the jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit, which was 
one of the first courts to adopt a broad reading of the exception. See Miller Metal Prods., 215 
F.2d at 224. The court in Kropfelder responded to the Miller Metal decision by stating its 
belief that the Fourth Circuit would adopt a narrow reading if faced with the same issue 
today. Kropfelder, 859 F. Supp. at 958. 
22. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995); Gilmer v. In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 
(1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
23. In a dissent to Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), Justice 
Frankfurter argued that the Supreme Court implicitly addressed the exception's scope and 
adopted a broad reading. The majority in Lincoln Mills elected to enforce an agreement to 
arbitrate between an employer and a labor union by utilizing § 301(a) of the LMRA instead 
of the FAA. 353 U.S. at 451. Frankfurter, however, believed that the FAA was a more 
appropriate mechanism for enforcing arbitration rights since the LMRA was silent on arbi-
tration. Therefore, he argued that courts could infer a "rejection, though not explicit" of a 
narrow reading of the FAA's employment contract exception because the majority had cho-
sen to use the LMRA in lieu of the FAA. He reasoned that, if the FAA - which "authorizes 
the federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in contracts generally" - could be uti-
lized to enforce arbitration provisions in employment contracts, "the Court would hardly spin 
such power out of the empty darkness of [the LMRA]," 353 U.S. at 466 (Frankfurter, J,, 
dissenting). Frankfurter concluded by saying that he would make the majority's implicit re-
jection of the narrow reading explicit. 353 U.S. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Contrary to Frankfurter's bold assertions, Lincoln Mills has hardly been the harbinger of 
courts adopting a broad reading of the FAA. Several lower courts have addressed his argu· 
ments and explicitly rejected them in the process of adopting a narrow view of the employ-
ment contract exception. See, e.g., International Assn. of Machinists v. General Elec. Co., 
406 F.2d 1046, 1049 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusing to overrule the narrow interpretation promul-
gated in Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), even in light of the Frankfurter dissent); 
Newark Stereotypers Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 596 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968). Because the LMRA's coverage is limited to 
collective bargaining agreements and does not reach individual employment contracts, one 
could argue that the Supreme Court did not make any implicit judgment in Lincoln Mills 
about the FAA's utility in the area of individual employment contracts. The Court simply 
felt it did not need to utilize the FAA in the area of collective bargaining. Cf. Pietro Scalzitti 
Co. v. International Union of Operating Engrs., Local No. 150, 351 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 
1965) (arguing that Frankfurter's view regarding the majority decision in Lincoln Mills was 
correct with regard to collective bargaining agreements). 
24. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). In Gilmer, an employee brought an age discrimination claim 
against his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1987 (ADEA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). As a condition of his employment, the employee had registered 
with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as a securities representative. The registration 
application contained a provision requiring the employee to arbitrate any dispute with his 
employer relating to the termination of employment. 500 U.S. at 23. The employer thus 
moved to compel arbitration when the employee brought suit. 500 U.S. at 24. The Court 
held that the FAA applied and granted the motion to compel arbitration. 500 U.S. at 24-35. 
The employee argued that he fell within the employment contract exception to the FAA, but 
the Court said that the exception was inapplicable because the agreement to arbitrate was 
contained in the NYSE registration application rather than the employment contract with 
Interstate/Johnson Lane. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. 
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the most recent opportunity to address the issue. In a footnote in 
Gilmer, the Court took note of the fact that several amici curiae 
had argued that the employment contract exception in section 1 of 
the FAA excluded all contracts of employment from the coverage 
of the FAA.25 The Court left the issue "for another day," however, 
because the parties did not raise the issue in the courts below or in 
the petition for certiorari and because it was beyond the scope of 
the case.26 In his dissent, Justice Stevens decided to address the 
scope of the employment contract exception anyway and argued for 
a broad interpretation.27 Stevens, however, is the only sitting Jus-
tice who has articulated an opinion on the subject. 
This Note argues that courts should adopt a narrow reading of 
the employment contract exception to the FAA, thus making arbi-
tration agreements in most individual employment contracts en-
forceable under the Act. Part I argues that a textual analysis of the 
FAA supports a narrow interpretation of the exception. Because 
some courts and commentators have argued that the text favors a 
broad interpretation, Part II examines the legislative history of the 
exception and demonstrates that no :firm conclusions can be drawn 
about congressional intent regarding the exception's scope. Finally, 
Part III demonstrates that a narrow reading of the exception best 
serves the purposes behind the FAA by overriding judicial hostility 
toward arbitration, placing arbitration agreements on an equal foot-
ing with other contract provisions, and providing a more efficient 
method of adjudication in the workplace. 
1. SUPPORTING A NARROW INTERPRETATION THROUGH 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
Courts begin interpreting a statute by first examining the stat-
ute's text.28 In studying the text, courts "assume that the legislative 
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. "29 
Once a court is satisfied that the text of a statute mandates a partic-
25. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. 
26. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. One commentator has argued that the majority decision actually 
reflects support for a narrow interpretation of the exception, despite the Court's express 
reluctance to address it. See Knight, supra note 6. This belief results from the fact that the 
NYSE registration form at issue in Gilmer was, for all practical purposes, the employment 
contract. Id. at 253. 
27. 500 U.S. at 39-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens argued that the primary concern 
of the FAA was a desire by the business community to overturn the common law rule that 
denied specific enforcement of arbitration agreements in business contracts. 500 U.S. at 39. 
It does not appear that Congress viewed the Act as so limited, however. See infra note 101. 
28. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) {Powell, J., concurring). 
29. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Richards v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)) {analyzing the text of§ 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
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u1ar interpretation, an inquiry into the text's meaning is generally 
finished.30 In examining the text of the employment contract ex-
ception of the FAA, it becomes apparent that the text justifies only 
a narrow31 interpretation of the exception. 
The FAA only applies to maritime transactions and those "con-
tract[s] evidencing ... transaction[s] involving commerce."32 The 
language in section 1 of the FAA defining "commerce" is thus espe-
cially significant because "commerce" plays a key role in defining 
the scope of the FAA: "'[C]ommerce', as herein defined, means 
commerce among the several States or \vith foreign nations ... but 
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce. "33 A cursory reading of this text al-
lows at least two possible interpretations of the employment con-
tract exception. First, the language of the final part - "other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" - may be 
construed broadly as referring to the entire class of workers within 
the scope of Congress's power over interstate commerce.34 Under 
this interpretation the exception wou1d cover almost all employ-
ment contracts. A second, narrower interpretation results from 
reading "other class of workers" to reach only those classes of 
workers similar in kind to seamen and railroad employees.3s 
An analysis of the text of the FAA produces three textually 
based arguments in favor of a narrow interpretation as the only rea-
sonable reading of the exception. First, section I.A argues that 
Congress understood the words engaged in interstate commerce as 
referring only to those classes of workers involved in the transporta-
tion of commerce. Second, section I.B argues that the statutory in-
terpretation canon ejusdem generis supports a narrow 
interpretation by limiting the general language of the exception. 
Third, section I.C argues that the traditional maxim that every part 
of a statute must be given effect also supports a narrow interpreta-
tion. Section I.D then responds to the argument that a narrow in-
terpretation of the exception will result in inconsistent definitions 
of commerce in sections 1and2 of the FAA. This section first con-
30. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993) (stating that unambiguous statu-
tory language can only be overcome by clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary): 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991) (stating that, when the text is clear, judi· 
cial inquiry is complete except in "rare and exceptional circumstances" (citing Demarest v. 
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)). 
31. A definition of the word ''narrow" in relation to the employment contract exception 
appears infra in the text accompanying note 35. 
32. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
33. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (emphasis added). 
34. For courts adopting this interpretation, see cases cited supra note 19. 
35. For courts adopting this interpretation, see cases cited supra note 20. 
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tends that no such inconsistency exists and then argues that any in-
consistency that might exist is explicable by analyzing the statute's 
text. 
A. Engaged in Interstate Commerce vs. Affecting 
Interstate Commerce 
An understanding of Congress's use of the word engaged in 
other contemporaneous legislation, along with the more limited 
view of the commerce power that prevailed at the time of the 
FAA's passage, indicates that a narrow interpretation of the em-
ployment contract exception in the FAA is the correct one. At the 
time of the FAA's passage in 1925, "Congressional power over indi-
viduals whose activities affected interstate commerce had not devel-
oped to the extent to which it was expanded in the succeeding 
years. "36 In fact, the Supreme Court routinely struck down federal 
statutes that sought to regulate economic activity beyond the inter-
state movement of goods.37 It was not until the 1937 decision 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 38 that the Court held that 
Congress was able to regulate activity that had a "serious effect 
upon interstate commerce."39 
The limited reach of the commerce power was reflected in a dis-
tinction Congress made between those workers who were engaged 
in interstate commerce and those who affected interstate com-
merce.40 The Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 (FELA)41 
provides a good example of this distinction. Initially, section 1 of 
the FELA contained language similar to section 1 of the FAA: 
"[E]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce 
between any of the several States or Territories ... shall be liable in 
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by 
36. Tenney Engg., Inc. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 
453 & n.9 {3d Cir. 1953) (en bane) (comparing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 {1922) and 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941) with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). 
37. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 {1936) {holding unconstitutional 
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in part because the Act regulated incidents 
"of production, not of trade"); AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
543 (1935) {holding part of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in part 
because the Poultry Code regulated activities taking place after "the flow in interstate com-
merce had ceased"); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 363 (1935) {hold-
ing unconstitutional a compulsory retirement and pension system for all interstate railroads 
in part because the objectives of the pension system had "no reasonable relation to the busi-
ness of interstate transportation"). 
38. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
39. 301 U.S. at 41 (emphasis added). 
40. Tenney Engg., 207 F.2d at 452-53. 
41. Employers' Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 {1908) (codified as amended at 
45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (1988)). 
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such carrier in such commerce .... "42 In the 1916 case Shanks v. 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. 43 the Supreme 
Court construed this language to apply only to workers "engaged in 
interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be 
practically a part of it."44 Courts construed affecting interstate com-
merce, on the other hand, to encompass not only workers engaged 
in the interstate transportation of commerce, but also all workers 
involved in the manufacture or production of interstate goods.4s 
The difference in interpretation between engaged in interstate 
commerce and affecting interstate commerce - as reflected in the 
text of the PELA and the 1916 Shanks decision - indicates that 
when Congress later used the word engaged in the FAA of 1925, 
and incorporated language substantially similar to the PELA, it 
likely intended that the language would be interpreted in the same 
manner as the language had in the PELA.46 
In 1939 Congress amended section 1 of the PELA, adding: 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such em-
ployee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or 
shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such com-
merce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this Act, be consid-
ered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce •.• ,47 
Congress had two purposes in amending the PELA: to enable the 
statute to reflect the Supreme Court's decision in Jones & Laughlin 
that the commerce power extended to activity that affected inter-
state commerce,48 and to settle a frequent subject of litigation 
under the PELA - the location of the line between interstate and 
42. Employers' Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65, 65 (1908) (emphasis added) 
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988)). 
43. 239 U.S. 556 (1916). 
44. 239 U.S. at 558. Shanks describes a number of situations in which the Court found 
employees to be engaged in commerce or so closely related to it as to be a part of it. These 
situations predominantly involved employees who repaired transportation vehicles involved 
in interstate commerce. The Court held that workers engaged in repairs on trains carrying 
only intrastate commerce and employees who mined coal for use in locomotives carrying 
only intrastate freight fell outside of the "engaged in commerce" definition. 299 U.S. at 558· 
59. 
45. See McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-94, 494 n.2 (1943) (construing the lan-
guage affecting commerce, which was rejected by Congress for the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
as extending to the furthest reaches of the commerce power and stating that the differences 
between engaging in and affecting were "well known to Congress"); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. 
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 151 (1942) (describing the commerce power as extending not only to 
transportation of interstate goods, but to all activities that affect commerce). 
46. Tenney Engg., Inc. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 
453 (3d Cir. 1953) (en bane) (using the FELA to interpret commerce in the FAA of 1925). 
47. Act of Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 685, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 51 
(1988)) (emphasis added). 
48. See Ermin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 F. Supp. 936, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (discussing 
comments made in a subcommittee hearing indicating that the language was added to reflect 
the extent of the commerce power under Jones & Laughlin). 
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intrastate commerce - by removing the need to determine that 
line.49 The amendment, by using the word affect and expanding the 
reach of the PELA, further demonstrates that Congress believed 
engaged in interstate commerce covered only a limited class of 
workers. 
The limited scope of engaged in interstate commerce is also re-
flected in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1928 (FLSA).50 The 
FLSA, passed three years after the FAA, applied to employees "en-
gaged in commerce," but it also applied to those engaged "in the 
production of goods for commerce."51 This language further indi-
cates that Congress understood the words engaged in interstate com-
merce to be limited to those workers in the transportation 
industries. 
B. Ejusdem Generis 
The statutory interpretation canon ejusdem generis provides a 
second textual argument in support of a narrow interpretation. The 
canon counsels that general words that follow more specific words 
should be limited to the same general class as the specific words.52 
Thus, for example, the word "other" in "grapefruits, oranges, and 
other fruits" should be limited to citrus fruits. The primary justifi-
cation for the canon is that Congress has no need to mention spe-
cific words or examples if it intends that the most general word or 
example be used in its unrestricted sense.53 The canon does have its 
49. Prader v. Pennsylvania R.R., 49 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943) (en bane) ("One 
of the main purposes of [the 1939 amendment to the FELA] was to eliminate the necessity of 
establishing that at the moment of his injury the employee was actually engaged in the move-
ment of interstate traffic. Its effect was to •.. include •.. all of a carrier's employees, any part 
of whose duties were in the furtherance of interstate commerce." (citation omitted)}; Pritt v. 
West Virginia N.R.R., 51S.E.2d105, 112 (W. Va. 1948) (arguing that the amendment was 
added to settle the location of the line between interstate and intrastate commerce because 
some railroads were engaged in both}, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 961 (1949). 
SO. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1928, ch. 676, 52 Stat 1060 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
52. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946) (concluding that because the 
phrase "other immoral purpose" in the Mann Act follows specific prohibitions of interstate 
prostitution and debauchery, "other immoral purpose" therefore includes polygamy); Samu-
els, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 980-81 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 957 (1991) (arguing that the canon could not be used to determine the scope of 
"other proceeding" in a list of situations in which the chief judge of the U.S. Tax Court could 
appoint a special trial judge); Tenney Engg., Inc. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 
Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953) (en bane) (applying the canon to the employ-
ment contract exception of the FAA); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUI'ES AND STATIITORY 
CoNSTRUCTION § 47.17 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the canon). 
53. 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 47.17. 
2180 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2171 
limits54 and its critics,55 but many courts have found it to be a valua-
ble aid. 
The language of the employment contract exception embraces 
three groups of workers: "seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce. "56 The dispute regarding the scope of the exception has re-
volved, of course, around the final group labeled "any other class of 
workers." Seamen and railroad workers are classes of workers in-
volved in the interstate transportation of commerce.s1 Under the 
canon ejusdem generis, therefore, "any other class of workers" 
should be read as encompassing only those workers involved in the 
interstate transportation of commerce. 
C. Every Part of a Statute Must Be Given Effect 
A second traditional maxim of statutory interpretation holds 
that every part of a statute must be given effect. Nothing in the 
statute should be "meaningless or superfluous. "58 Courts justify 
this maxim by explaining that Congress does not place words in a 
statute without a purpose.59 Application of this maxim to the em-
ployment contract exception demonstrates that only a narrow read-
ing of the exception utilizes all of the exception's language. 
A broad interpretation of the employment contract exception 
would make the two specific classes of workers mentioned in the 
exception superfluous. Reading "any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce"60 to include all workers 
subject to Congress's commerce power would mean that "other" 
encompasses seamen and railroad workers and eliminates the need 
for their specific enumeration. If Congress had intended for the 
54. Like all intrinsic aids, courts should only apply the canon when a statute is subject to 
more than one interpretation. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 {1984) (citing Harri-
son v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980)). Courts can also override the canon when the 
"whole context dictates a different conclusion." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dis-
patchers Assn., 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). Using ejusdem generis is also inappropriate when 
the result would be contrary to a statute's legislative history or when the specific words "em-
brace all the persons or objects of the class designated by the enumeration." 2A SINOBR, 
supra note 52, §§ 47.21-22. 
55. See 2A SINOBR, supra note 52, § 47.18 (mentioning that some courts and commenta-
tors have seen the canon as a remnant of strict constructionism and thus heir to strict con-
structionism's shortcomings) . 
. 56. 9 u.s.c. § 1 {1988). 
57. See supra section I.A. 
58. Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1093 {6th Cir. 1983); see also National 
Insulation Transp. Comm. v. ICC, 683 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 2A SINOBR, supra note 
52, § 46.06. 
59. Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) ("Congress is not to be presumed to 
have used words for no purpose."); Adler v. Northern Hotel Co., 175 F.2d 619, 621 {7th Cir. 
1949). 
60. 9 u.s.c. § 1 (1988). 
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exception to be read to encompass all employment contracts, it 
would have said so rather than enumerating specific classes of 
workers.61 Because Congress elected to enumerate two specific 
groups of workers, however, and insert a more general clause fol-
lowing them, courts can infer that the exception is supposed to be 
read narrowly. 
It could be argued that a narrow interpretation also violates the 
statutory maxim because, by defining "any other classes of work-
ers" as referring to classes of workers in the transportation of inter-
state commerce, "any other classes of workers" also encompasses 
the specific enumerations of seamen and railroad employees. In 
fact, however, under a narrow interpretation the specific enumera-
tions provide a context for defining the general class. Therefore, a 
narrow interpretation of the exception, unlike a broad interpreta-
tion, does not violate the maxim that every part of a statute be 
given effect. 
D. Inconsistent Definitions of Commerce in the FAA 
Some courts and commentators have argued that a narrow in-
terpretation of the ·employment contract exception produces incon-
sistent definitions of commerce within sections 1 and 2 of the FAA. 
Section 2 of the FAA makes all arbitration provisions in "con-
tract[ s] evidencing ... transaction[s] involving commerce ... valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable."62 The Supreme Court has indicated 
that this section's mandates extend as broadly as the commerce 
power on which it is based.63 Therefore, a narrow interpretation of 
"workers engaged in interstate commerce" in section 1 of the Act 
might seem inconsistent because it is limited to only a small seg-
ment of the employees affecting interstate commerce. 
There are two responses to this argument. The first is to deny 
the inconsistency. Unlike section 2 of the FAA, the section 1 ex-
ception relates to workers engaged in interstate commerce. As 
mentioned in section I.A, Congress understood the word engaged 
to indicate a particular subset of workers who affect interstate com-
merce - those workers in the transportation industries. Therefore, 
the word commerce in section 1 does not have a different meaning 
than commerce in section 2 of the Act. 
Even if an inconsistency did exist between the section 1 com-
merce and the section 2 commerce, the text of the statute provides 
61. DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
62. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
63. See Allied-Bruce Tenninix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. a. 834, 839-40 (1995); Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (describing the FAA as "embodyi[ng] Congress' intent to 
provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce 
Clause"). 
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two justifications for this inconsistency. First, exceptions tradition-
ally are construed narrowly.64 By defining the scope of the section 
1 exception as including all employment contracts affecting inter-
state commerce, the exception may be given a much broader reach 
than Congress intended. In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that the FAA reflects Congress's desire to expand and support arbi-
tration.65 A broad exception, therefore, might undercut this goal. 
A second justification for maintaining the inconsistency relies 
upon a distinction between the two placements of the word com-
merce in the text of the FAA. The word commerce in section 2 of 
the Act takes its meaning froni the previously quoted66 definition of 
commerce in section 1 of the Act. The word commerce in section 1 
of the Act is located within the section 1 definition of commerce -
in the part of the definition this Note labels the employment con-
tract exception. The word commerce within the definition of com-
merce, however, obviously cannot be defined by referring to the 
definition that contains it. Therefore, an alternative and narrower, 
although inconsistent, definition becomes possible for the word 
commerce in section 1 as well as the employment contract 
exception. 
IJ. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION 
When a statute permits only one reasonable interpretation, in-
quiry into the statute's meaning is generally finished because courts 
will look outside of the statute's text only when the statute can be 
interpreted in more than one way.67 Although Part I concluded 
that the text mandates a narrow interpretation of the employment 
contract exception, some courts have reached the opposite conclu-
sion and held that a broad interpretation is proper.68 Therefore, 
this Part examines the legislative history of the FAA.69 Although 
the legislative history of the FAA does not affirmatively support a 
64. United States v. J.E. Mamiye & Sons, 665 F.2d 336, 339-40 (C.C.P.A. 1981} (constru-
ing a statutory exception from custom duties narrowly}; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. 
FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the words of exceptions should be 
strictly construed to limit the exception), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976); United States v. 
california, 504 F.2d 750, 754 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); 
2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 47.08 (stating that provisos should be strictly construed). 
65. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
66. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
67. See cases cited supra note 30. 
68. See cases cited supra note 19. 
69. Courts frequently resort to the legislative history of a statute if the statute's text can 
be interpreted in more than one way. See, e.g., United States v. McLemore, 28 F.3d 1160, 
1163 (11th Cir. 1994) (arguing that courts should look to the statute's legislative history when 
the text of the statute can be interpreted in more than one way); City of Edmonds v. Wash-
ington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), affd. sub nom. City 
of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995). 
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narrow reading, it does not - as some have claimed70 - provide 
clear support for a broad reading either. 
As Part I demonstrated, Congress recognized a distinction be-
tween the scope of the words engaged in interstate commerce and 
affecting interstate commerce. Besides Congress's choice of words 
in contemporaneous statutes, the distinction is shown in a brief sub-
mitted to the Joint Committee of Subcommittees on the Judiciary 
during hearings on the FAA.71 This brief, which one commentator 
has cited as the most important authority on the FAA,12 made a 
similar distinction between the interstate movement of goods and 
affecting commerce: 
It is not only the actual and physical interstate shipment of goods which 
is subject to the interstate commerce powers of the Federal Govern-
ment, but these powers govern every agency or act which bears so 
close a relationship to interstate commerce that they can reasonably 
be said to affect it. 73 
This brief is perhaps the most persuasive evidence that in passing 
the FAA Congress understood engaged in interstate commerce to 
encompass only those workers involved in the transportation of in-
terstate commerce, while Congress understood affecting interstate 
commerce to reach those workers who produced the goods for 
transportation as well. 
The legislative history of the FAA is short and contains little 
mention of the employment contract exception. The FAA is some-
what unusual in that Congress had a limited role in drafting the 
statute. Instead, the American Bar Association (ABA) drafted the 
initial language and some of the amendments to the Act.74 
In December 1922, Senator Sterling and Congressman Mills in-
troduced the first draft of the bill that was to become the FAA.75 
70. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991). 
71. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-41 (1924) 
[hereinafter Hearings Before 68th Congress]. 
72. MAOIBIL, supra note 8, at 97 ("If there were ever any doubt about congressional 
understanding as to what it was doing respecting the applicability of the act, this brief would 
remove that doubt"). 
73. Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 71, at 38 (emphasis added). 
74. See MAcNEIL, supra note 8, at 107 ("[T]he role of Congress in enacting the [FAA] 
was the limited one of making a few modest changes in what the A.B.A. presented to it, and, · 
finally, of putting its stamp of approval on the bar association's product"). 
75. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Com-
mercial Arbitration: Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 2 (1923) [hereinafter Hearings Before 67th 
Congress]. The FAA was a response to the general unenforceability and revocability of 
agreements to arbitrate during the era. The American Bar Association (ABA) drafted the 
statute, see Proceedings of the American Bar Association, 45 A.B.A. REP.19, 75 (1920) (di-
recting the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law to "consider and report 
••• upon the further extension of the principle of commercial arbitration"), and based it on 
the 1920 New York Arbitration Law, 1920 N.Y. LAws ch. 275 (current version codified at 
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This draft did not contain the employment contract exception. In 
response to concerns raised at a subcommittee hearing on the bill, 
the ABA made several revisions in the bill - including the addi-
tion of the employment contract exception - before reintroducing 
it in the next Congress. This draft, with minor changes, became the 
FAA.16 
The ABA added the language comprising the employment con-
tract exception in response to fears raised by the Seamen's Union. 
The union argued that "seamen's wages came within admiralty ju-
risdiction and should not be subject to an agreement to arbitrate."77 
During the initial hearing on the FAA before a Senate subcommit-
tee, W.H.H. Piatt, the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted 
the FAA, responded to this criticism: 
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitration 
[sic] in any sense; and so I suggest that ... if your honorable commit-
tee should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add to the 
bill the following language, "but nothing herein contained shall apply 
to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign com-
merce." It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor 
disputes at all.1s 
Piatt's statement could be construed to indicate that it was not 
the intention of the drafters to include employment contracts - or 
at least collective bargaining agreements - within the scope of the 
statute. As such, this statement probably furnishes the strongest 
argument in favor of a broad interpretation of the exception.79 
N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1995)). The New York 
Arbitration Law carried forward existing legal provisions regarding arbitration but also made 
written contracts for future disputes "valid, enforc[ea]ble, and irrevocable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 1920 N.Y. LAWS ch. 
275, § 2 (current version at N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 7501 (McKinney 1980)). 
76. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 91. After resubmission of the draft, Congress held a joint 
hearing, Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 71, regarding the draft on January 9, 
1924. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 92. The House submitted a favorable report on January 24, 
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1924), and the Senate followed on May 14, S. 
REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1924). The Senate added several minor amend-
ments and passed the bill on January 31, 1925. The House then considered and passed the 
Senate version on February 4 of the same year. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 100-01. Fmally, 
President Coolidge signed the FAA into law on February 12, 1925. Id. at 101. 
77. Tenney Engg., Inc. v; United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d 
Cir. 1953) (en bane) (quoting Report on the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial 
Law, 48 AB.A. REP. 284, W (1923)). 
78. Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 75, at 9. 
79. Statements made by draftsmen like Mr. Piatt at hearings concerning the nature and 
effect of a proposed statute have been accepted as an indication of legislative intent. See, e.g., 
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Lab., 460 U.S. 150, 160 (1983); Zuber v. 
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 181-83, 186 (1969); Florida Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commn., 425 
F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1970), revd. sub nom. Gainesville Utils. Dept. v. Florida Power 
Corp., 402 U.S. 515 (1971); 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 48.10 ("Similarly, if the legislature 
adopts an amendment urged by a witness, it may be assumed that the intent voiced was 
adopted by the legislature."). Oddly, however, courts advocating the broad interpretation 
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Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt the utility of Piatt's state-
ment as a basis for a broad interpretation. 
First, Piatt's statement that the FAA was not an "industrial arbi-
tration" intended to cover "labor disputes,"BO could be construed -
with equal plausibility - to reflect a belief that the FAA would not 
cover collective bargaining agreements, as opposed to individual 
employment contracts. Seamen and railroad workers - the partic-
ular classes mentioned in the employment contract exception -
were unionized workforces and were already subject to arbitration 
by other statutes.s1 In addition, the exception was added directly in 
response to the Seamen's Union.82 Both of these factors indicate 
that even the draftsmen of the FAA may not have intended the 
exception to extend to individual employment contracts. 
Second, an exchange between Piatt and Senator Walsh, the 
committee chair, demonstrates that the draftsmen's interpretation 
of the bill's language may have differed from that of Congress. The 
exchange, which followed Piatt's statement, indicates that the Sena-
tor may not have understood the insertion of the language compris-
ing the employment contract exception to exclude all employment 
contracts. After Piatt's statement, Senator Walsh responded by as-
serting: "I see no reason at all ... why, when two men voluntarily 
agree to admit their controversy to arbitration, they should not be 
compelled to have it decided that way."83 Piatt responded simply 
"Yes, sir."84 Senator Walsh then reflected: "The trouble about the 
matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into 
are really not voluntary things at all .... It is the same with a good 
many contracts of employment."85 This exchange, including Sena-
tor Walsh's remark about adhesion contracts, indicates that it was 
not clear from Piatt's original statement that all employment con-
tracts should be excluded from the FAA. 
Finally, determining congressional intent is difficult in normal 
circumstances,86 but determining intent is even more difficult in the 
have only recently cited this statement. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 
F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991). 
80. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
81. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, tit. III, 41 Stat. 456, 469-74 (repealed 1926) (rail-
road workers); Act of June 7, 1872, ch. 322, § 25, 17 Stat. 262, 267 (repealed 1983) (seamen). 
The Seamen's Union was concerned that the FAA would make its members' wages subject to 
arbitration - a condition of employment that was not then arbitrable. See Tenney Engg., 
207 F.2d at 452. 
82. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
83. Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 75, at 9. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See, e.g., 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 45.05 (stating that many methods have been 
used to determine legislative intent, including examining a statute's language and legislative 
history, and applying notions of fairness, but no single method can truly reach what is in-
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case of the FAA, because the ABA, rather than Congress, drafted 
the statute. As one commentator has noted, "When [Congress] 
simply enacts legislation presented to it, the proper question is how 
Congress understood what was presented and upon which it put its 
stamp of approval."87 Furthermore, there was almost no debate on 
the FAA when it was brought to the House and Senate floors -
making it even more dangerous to impute the intentions of the bill's 
drafters to the entire Congress.ss 
Although these arguments regarding the legislative history of 
the FAA do not necessarily support a narrow interpretation of the 
employment contract exception, they do demonstrate that no clear 
message regarding the scope of the exception can be derived from 
that legislative history. In light of the textual analysis of Part I, 
which demonstrated that a narrow interpretation is the only reason-
able reading of the exception, the absence of any clear, contrary 
message in the legislative history means that courts should give ef-
fect to this reasonable reading. 
ill. EFFECTUATING THE PURPOSES OF THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION Acr 
Part I demonstrated that the text of the FAA favors a narrow 
interpretation of the employment contract exception and Part II 
showed that the legislative history does not support a contrary read-
ing. Many courts might find it appropriate to stop here. In general, 
however, statutes must be construed to effectuate their purposes, 
and courts should avoid constructions that defeat those purposes.89 
This Part examines the purposes of the FAA and argues that a nar-
row interpretation of the employment contract exception best effec-
tuates these purposes. Section ID.A identifies the three principal 
purposes behind passage of the FAA: overriding the longstanding 
judicial hostility toward arbitration, placing agreements to arbitrate 
on an equal footing with other contract provisions, and providing 
tended because "[t]he question of meaning lies deeper than the law"). Some commentators 
have even argued that "legislative intent" is somewhat of a fallacy due to the differing mo-
tives and understandings of the many members making up a legislature. See, e.g., Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INTI.. REv. L. 
& ECON. 239, 244 (1992). 
frl. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 108. 
88. Because so few members of Congress are likely to have had a chance to hear Piatt's 
understanding of the legislation's scope, most would have been likely to form their own opin-
ions about the bill when, and if, they personally read the bill before voting on it. But cf. 2A 
SINGER, supra note 52, § 48.06 (arguing that, when parts of a bill pass without change, one 
can infer legislative intent for a bill from the intentions of the committee that drafted it). 
89. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (arguing that a court's duty is to 
"find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the 
sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress 
manifested") (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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for more speedy and cost-effective adjudication. Section m.B then 
argues that a narrow interpretation of the exception serves these 
purposes because: (i) a broad interpretation would maintain the 
effect of the former judicial hostility to arbitration; (ii) a narrow 
interpretation will make agreements to arbitrate in individual em-
ployment contracts irrevocable and enforceable in the federal court 
system; (iii) and a narrow interpretation will result in more efficient 
adjudication of employment-related disputes. 
A. The Purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act 
Congress had three purposes in enacting the FAA. The first of 
these was to override a longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements.9o At the time Congress passed the FAA, judges had 
developed a disdain for arbitration. Judges were primarily reacting 
to fear that they would be ousted from much of their jurisdiction,91 
although they may have had more noble reasons as well.92 
The second purpose behind the FAA's passage was to place 
agreements to arbitrate on an equal footing with other contract pro-
visions.93 At the time of the Act's passage, arbitration agreements 
were largely ineffective because, unlike other contract provisions, 
no law prevented a party to an arbitration agreement from revoking 
that agreement at any time.94 The FAA sought to correct this defi-
ciency by making arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract."95 
The third and final purpose for the passage of the FAA was to 
provide for more speedy and cost-effective adjudication. Congress 
believed that arbitration could alleviate the overcrowding of court 
dockets, result in quicker decisions, and remove the burden of 
costly litigation.96 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Con-
90. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-Cul-
ver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 71, at 14-15, 
26, 38; Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 75, at 3; S. REP. No. 536, supra note 76, at 
2; H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 76, at 1-2. 
91. S. REP. No. 536, supra note 76, at 2-3 (stating that one of the primary reasons for not 
enforcing arbitration agreements was the fear among judges that "courts would be ousted of 
much of their jurisdiction" and that this may have had "much to do with inspiring the fear 
that arbitration tribunals could not do justice between the parties"); Hirshman, supra note 3, 
at 1310-11. 
92. Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 71, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen 
stating that judges were concerned with the bargaining power of individuals in agreeing to 
arbitrate rather than with losing fees obtained from litigants). 
93. See sources cited supra note 90. 
94. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 20. 
95. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
96. S. REP. No. 536, supra note 76, at 3 ("The desire to avoid the delay and expense of 
litigation persists."). H.R. REP. No. 96 supra note 76, at 2 states: 
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gress recognized the efficiency benefits that arbitration would 
bring97 and lower courts have continued to emphasize these bene-
fits as an important goal of the Act.98 The congressional hearings99 
and the committee reports100 for the FAA also emphasize Con-
gress's recognition of the efficiency benefits of the Act.101 
[T]he party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is not subject to the delay and 
cost of litigation. 
..• It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when 
there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters 
can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration ..•. 
97. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). 
98. See, e.g., Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir.1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990); Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tiie Co., 259 F. Supp. 688, 693 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
99. Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 71, at 7 ("[A]rbitration saves time, saves 
trouble, saves money."), 13 (The Act would "make the disposition of business in the commer-
cial world less expensive and more expeditious."), 34-35 ("The evils at which arbitration 
agreements in general are directed are ••• (1) The long delay usually incident to a proceeding 
at law •.. [and] (2) The expense of litigation."); Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 
75, at 2 ("It will reduce litigation. It will enable business men to settle their disputes expedi-
tiously and economically, and will reduce the congestion in the Federal and State courts."). 
100. See supra note 96. 
101. The context of the FAA's enactment might lead one to believe that the aforemen-
tioned purposes might apply only to commercial contracts. Support for the enactment of an 
arbitration statute arose first in New York, where the commercial and financial centers relied 
extensively on arbitration despite the lack of legal support. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 26. 
Out of this support came the New York Arbitration Law of 1920, 1920 N.Y. LAws ch. 275 
(current version codified at N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 
1995)), which served as a model for the draftsmen of the FAA. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 41. 
In addition, there are many references in the FAA's committee hearings that emphasize arbi-
tration's value in commercial settings. See, e.g., Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 
71, at 11-12 ("[W]e are very much in favor of the objectives of an arbitration in commercial 
matters."), 13 ("[T]o make the disposition of business in the commercial world less expensive 
and more expeditious."); Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra note 75, at 2 ("The commer-
cial bodies of the country have been urging the adoption of this ... legislation throughout the 
country .... "), 3 ("The foundation of our commercial structure is a contract in which is an 
arbitration clause."), 9 ("It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, 
at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and 
agreeing with each other ..•. "). 
The purposes of the Act, however, were not so limited. Statements in the committee 
hearings and in the committee reports indicate that, although the draftsmen may have writ-
ten the Act with an emphasis on commercial disputes, Congress contemplated something 
much broader. See Hearings Before 68th Congress, supra note 71, at 1; Hearings Before 67th 
Congress, supra note 75, at 2 ("The second section provides that a written provision in any 
contract or maritime transaction or transaction involving commerce to settle a controversy by 
arbitration ..• shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable." (emphasis added}); S. REP. No. 
536, supra note 76, at 3 ("The settlement of disputes by arbitration appeals to ••• corporate 
interests as well as to individuals."); H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 76, at 2 ("The purpose of 
this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts 
involving interstate commerce .•• or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal 
Courts." (emphasis added)). But see S. REP. No. 536, supra note 76, at 1 (removing the 
words "contract or" from section 2 of the FAA and amending the section to read "maritime 
transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce"). 
Senator Walsh questioned speakers in one hearing about the Act's utility in labor agree-
ments, insurance contracts, and construction contracts, indicating that he viewed the Act's 
language as reaching beyond commercial disputes. See Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra 
note 75, at 9-10. In response to the questioning about labor agreements, Piatt stated that it 
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B. Fulfilling the Goals of the FAA 
A narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception 
best effectuates each of the purposes behind the FAA's passage. 
Unlike a broad interpretation of the employment contract excep-
tion, a narrow interpretation effectuates the congressional purpose 
of overriding judicial hostility towards arbitration. Prior to the 
FAA, the hostility toward arbitration manifested itself in a refusal 
by judges to enforce agreements to arbitrate.102 Yet, a broad inter-
pretation of the employment contract exception could also result in 
the nonenforcement of agreements in individual employment con-
tracts.103 A narrow interpretation, by contrast, will require courts 
was not the draftsmen's intention that the FAA extend to labor disputes and suggested to 
Senator Walsh that the language of the employment contract exception be added. Id. at 9. 
As has previously been demonstrated, however, the language comprising this exception en-
compassed only a few distinct classes of labor contracts and not all employment contracts. 
See supra Part I. Significantly, when Senator Walsh next questioned Piatt about insurance 
agreements, Piatt stated similarly that "it is not the intention of this bill to cover insurance 
cases," but offered no similar exempting language. Hearings Before 67th Congress, supra 
note 75, at 9-10. This exchange demonstrates that Senator Walsh contemplated that the Act 
would reach more than commercial disputes - even if the draftsmen did not. 
Moreover, the insertion of the employment contract exception does not limit the FAA's 
purposes to commercial transactions. Instead, it simply indicates a desire to exempt certain 
classes of workers from the scope of these general purposes. As noted previously, the drafts-
men created the exception in direct response to the desire of the Seamen's Union that issues 
such as wages remain under admiralty jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
This context indicates that the purpose of the exception was not to limit the scope of the Act 
to purely commercial transactions, but to placate certain classes of workers who wished to 
remain exempt from the provisions of the Act. 
102. Judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements is largely a relic of the past. Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989) (describing a 
steady erosion of hostility beginning in the lower federal courts). But cf. Securities Indus. 
Assn. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts must be on guard for arti-
fices in which the ancient suspicion of arbitration might reappear."), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 
956 (1990). The hostility has disappeared primarily because judges have observed the bene-
fits of the arbitration system including a reduction of the burden on the court system. In 
addition, respect for arbitration has increased as the competence of the arbitrators has grown 
and their utility in complex, technical cases has become apparent. John C. Norling, Note, 
The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's Preemption Power: An Examination of the Import 
of Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 7 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOI ... 139, 144-45 (1991) 
(stating that the competence of arbitral tribunals is higher than ever and that they are better 
suited to handle highly technical cases). 
103. Cf. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1068 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(stating that the FAA should "be implemented in such a way as to make arbitration effective 
and not to erect technical and unsubstantial barriers" such as those created in the time when 
courts viewed arbitration "with suspicion and hostility"). Although judicial hostility toward 
arbitration is largely a thing of the past, see supra note 102, there is no statutory enforcement 
mechanism other than the FAA for agreements to arbitrate in individual employment con-
tracts. Under a broad interpretation, federal judges would have to resort to the federal com-
mon law of contracts - which is still largely undeveloped and rife with constitutional 
difficulties, see Arturo Gandera, Contracts in Wonderland: A Fable Regarding the Adminis-
trative Adjudication of Qualifying Facility Contracts in California, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 307, 
366-97 (1994) (detailing the difficulties of applying federal law to adjudicate contract disputes 
involving utilities) - or, more likely, borrow from state statutes and common law regarding 
contracts and arbitration. Under the latter approach, local differences could "cause unequal 
treatment, vitiate the national purpose underlying the Act, and undermine the pre-emptive 
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to enforce these agreements in individual employment contracts by 
malting them "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. "104 
A narrow interpretation of the employment contract exception 
also better serves the purpose of placing arbitration agreements on 
an equal footing with other contract provisions. Under a broad in-
terpretation, parties would continue to be able to repudiate volun-
tary agreements to arbitrate in individual employment contracts, 
even though other ·contract provisions would remain enforceable. 
A broad interpretation would thus deal a serious blow to the equal-
ity of arbitration provisions vis-a-vis other contract provisions that 
courts are not free to disregard. A narrow interpretation, however, 
would enable courts to enforce arbitration provisions in individual 
employment contracts just like any other· contractual arrangement, 
which was what Congress sought to achieve.1os 
The Fourth Circuit has already shown a determination to fulfill 
the purpose of equal treatment of arbitration provisions under the 
FAA in another situation. In Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Wil-
liams,106 the court stated that the FAA preempted a Virginia law 
prohibiting mandatory arbitration.101 The court felt that the FAA 
prohibited states from placing greater restrictions upon arbitration 
provisions than other contractual provisions.1os A broad interpre-
tation of the employment contract·exception would have an effect 
similar to that of the rejected Vrrginia law - it would subject arbi-
tration provisions in individual employment contracts to a different 
standard than other contract provisions by rendering them 
unenforceable.109 
Finally, a narrow interpretation of the employment contract ex-
ception would best serve the purposes of reducing costly courtroom 
effect accorded the Act." Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 Tui.. L. 
REv. 1377, 1452 (1991). 
104. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 
105. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Cbrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985) ("The 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,' manifested by this .•• 
Act ... is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrange-
ments .... ") (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.1, 
24 (1983)); 473 U.S. at 626 ("[A]s with any contract, the parties' intentions [should] 
control .•• "). 
106. 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990). 
107. 905 F.2d at 723 ("We hold today that § 2 does preempt state rules of contract fonna-
tion which single out arbitration clauses and unreasonably burden the ability to fonn arbitra-
tion agreements."). 
108. 905 F.2d at 722 (citing Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 806-07 {8th Cir. 
1986); see also 905 F.2d at 723 ("[A] state may not refuse to enforce and may not revoke an 
existing arbitration agreement on the ground that the contract did not comply with rules of 
contract fonnation applicable only to arbitration provisions."). 
109. Cf. 905 F.2d at 723 (arguing that legislatures should not "circumvent Congressional 
intent by enacting special rules to discourage or prohibit the fonnation of agreements to 
arbitrate"). 
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litigation and expediting resolutions of controversies.11° A broad 
interpretation, by permitting courts to ignore arbitration provisions, 
would send a continuous stream of employment related disputes to 
the already overburdened court system. In contrast, a narrow inter-
pretation will allow arbitrators to resolve most of these disputes 
more quickly and with less cost to the parties by utilizing the bene-
fits of arbitration to their fullest. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted the FAA, it viewed arbitration as a ·bet-
ter means to an equally just end. The members realized that, in 
many situations, arbitration is a better method of dispute resolution 
than courtroom litigation. Nowhere is this more true than in the 
employment context, as demonstrated by the increasing number of 
individual employment contracts containing arbitration clauses.111 
Further, employees often lack the :financial means to pursue even 
the strongest of claims in a court of law. Employers, meanwhile, 
cannot afford the loss of productivity and morale that long employ-
ment disputes often create. Arbitration allows these parties to re-
solve their disputes more quickly and with less expense than typical 
courtroom litigation. Perhaps even more important, arbitration's 
less adversarial nature offers each side a chance to sit down, face 
each other, and communicate. These advantages would be lost, 
however, if the FAA's employment contract exception were read 
too broadly. Courts should recognize these compelling justifica-
tions and construe the provision narrowly, allowing employees and 
employers to enforce arbitration agreements. In so doing, courts 
will fulfill the purposes of the FAA: to strengthen and encourage 
the use of arbitration in dispute resolution. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5. 
111. See S. Gale Dick, Feature, ADR at the Crossroads, 49 DISP. REsoL J. 47, 52 (1994) 
("More and more firms in certain industries are inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into 
their employment contracts • . . • [E]mployment disputes promise to be one of the biggest 
growth areas for ADR in the coming years."). 
